Baroness Helic: My Lords, it is honour to speak in a debate on this subject in which the noble Lord, Lord Ashdown, will take part. I pay tribute to his work and legacy as high representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His tenure represents the high-water mark of international engagement in the western Balkans and, indeed, elsewhere in the world. It is no exaggeration to say that had he not left in 2006 the situation in Bosnia would be vastly better than it is today, and I hope that the Government will heed his advice when he speaks today. I declare an interest as stated in the report, and I thank the International Relations Committee and its clerks, advisers and staff for their role in our inquiry. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, for his invaluable insights during the proceedings and the work of the committee.
The subject we debate today is not only the future of the western Balkans, but the future of stability in Europe as a continent as a whole and ultimately our  own security in the United Kingdom. Twenty-five years ago, the wars in the former Yugoslavia claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, created millions of refugees and came to an end only after a decisive investment of diplomacy, military intervention and humanitarian aid. I pay particular tribute to members of the British Armed Forces who gave their lives to bring peace to the Balkans. Our country can be proud of what it has contributed in stabilising that region.
As someone who has worked in foreign policy for many years, who was born in what used to be former Yugoslavia, who has friends in most countries in the region and who visits it frequently, I wish I could be more optimistic about its future. Our inquiry’s report is effectively a warning about the consequences of years of neglect and misguided thinking in EU policy towards the western Balkans, and dangerous trends in the region that could have a significant impact on the long-term interests and security of the UK and the transatlantic alliance. It is a call for urgent and sustained preventive diplomacy from our country and our allies. I believe the Government share many of the committee’s assessments, but I am not convinced that our commitment and engagement yet reflect the full gravity of the situation or that the EU as a whole has a united view, understanding and clear plan of action. I hope this will change and that our country will play a decisive role in that.
As things stand, since 2008 we, the EU and our allies the United States have progressively withdrawn our forces and our attention from the western Balkans, not because we have completed the task of stabilising the region—far from it—but because of the belief, justified in certain cases, that other issues demanded more attention from us: first Afghanistan, then Iraq, then the spread of international terrorism, and perhaps now Brexit. These competing priorities have driven the western Balkans down the agenda of the international community at a time when other negative trends and influences are on the rise in the region. The EU policy in particular has been grounded in hope, not reality, and in wishful thinking rather than coherent strategy.
I do not wish to overlook the progress that has been made in the region. Croatia is a member of the EU and NATO, Serbia is an EU accession country, Montenegro and Albania are NATO member states and Brussels is committed, at least on paper, to EU accession for other countries in the region. However, that is a narrative impeded by unresolved issues in a region that is being captured by nationalists in suits who have swapped the guns of the 1990s for the iPads of 2018 and public relations companies, in an environment where corruption is eating societies and democratic institutions from within. To be specific, the frozen conflict between Kosovo and Serbia has not been resolved and remains a political flashpoint. I hope the Minister will give a clear assurance today that Britain will not agree to the changing of Kosovo’s borders or indeed any revision of borders in the Balkans. The issue of Macedonia’s name has also yet to be resolved and, as a result, Macedonia’s future remains hostage to Greek and Macedonian nationalists. In Bosnia and Herzegovina secessionists remain committed to the dismembering of the country, which, I deeply regret to say, continues with tacit political support and sometimes  even encouragement from some leaders in Belgrade and Zagreb—one reason, I regret, why Croatia was not a focus of our committee’s inquiry.
There has been little progress in changing Zagreb’s and Belgrade’s goals in Bosnia since the Milošević and Tuđman days. Even now, Croatian politicians and their proxies in Bosnia in particular use the EU to drive through their destructive policies, while Serbia uses proxies in Bosnia in support of Russia to do its own work.

Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: My Lords, it is a very great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, who has been an inspiration to me. I thank her for her very kind words, but she underestimates the huge advantage I had from an excellent international strategy, some outstanding international partners and, above all—I pay tribute to them here—some very, very brave Bosnian politicians, who were partners to the process of reform in which we were engaged.
I shall touch on that in a moment because I have to say that all that work has been very largely wasted away in the last 10 to 12 years. First, I am privileged to take part in this debate, and to have given evidence as a witness to the committee for its excellent report which I commend to others. I am sure noble Lords will understand if I concentrate for a moment on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here I have to say, perhaps a little more bluntly than I dared to for the past 12 years, that frankly the last 12 years of international policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been a disaster. I shall enumerate why and outline one very profound and extremely dangerous threat that now confronts us.
Over those years—it just happens to be coincidental with my leaving—the international community’s policy changed. For the first 10 years of Bosnia’s existence post the Dayton agreement, Bosnia was the poster boy for post-conflict international integration and rebuilding. We made more progress on that than any other nation on earth. Then in 2006, the European Union changed its policy. Instead of being involved actively, muscularly from time to time, and using its influence, it engaged some—I know who it was; I will not be ruder than I need to be—fool who decided that this was the moment to withdraw and leave everything to local ownership. Everybody who knew anything about Bosnia knew perfectly well that, from that moment, the centripetal forces that we had generated would reverse. As Bosnia was not yet in a stable state, the centrifugal forces would take effect, and that is exactly what happened. Nationalism has risen; secessionism is more in order; we are now moving towards a definite intent, although a hidden one, to create the conditions in which secession can take place. Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be broken up, as at least two of the leaders of the nationalist ethnicities are now intending to do, without bloodshed. For reasons I shall give in a moment, the European Union is now an unwitting partner in that. We have got just about everything wrong.
First, I depended utterly on the strong EU-US partnership, which has weakened over time. By the way, I was in Washington for the last four years—four days, not years, thank God!—and was pleased to discover that there was a new mood at a lower level in Washington to begin to work with the European Union on something, and the west Balkans is a primary candidate. I know that that view is understood in the Foreign Office, and I hope that we will take advantage of this moment to put together that strong partnership with the EU in Brussels. I used to say that if we stand together across the Atlantic and stand united, there is nothing we cannot do in the Balkans and in Bosnia. But if we are divided, as we have been, there is nothing we can do.
Secondly, we have abandoned a regional policy in favour of a penny-packet policy—the so-called regatta principle—where we deal with each country individually, and the first to get across the finishing line gets to Europe. That denies you all the regional linkages you can use to get things done. What matters in the Balkans is not what happens, but the connection between the things that happen. If I wanted to move things in Bosnia, I did not just go to Brussels; I went to Belgrade and Zagreb. Playing those linkages is a crucial way of getting policies through. If you want to deal with Republika Srpska’s irredentism and secessionism, go to Belgrade; that is your key leverage. However, we have abandoned that. We have believed, quite wrongly, that Kosovo is the key vital ground of the Balkans. It is not. Kosovo is the modern version of Schleswig-Holstein. It requires time, and only time will solve it. We need only hold the ring and show strategic patience, and Kosovo will solve itself. The powder trails that blow the Balkans up are two, and one is Macedonia—I am very glad indeed to see progress made there, although that is a bit tenuous over the last couple of days—and the second is Bosnia, from which we have withdrawn. As I shall say in a moment, that leads to an extremely dangerous situation in my view.
Thirdly, we have lost our focus in Bosnia. I used to say, and I still believe it to be true, “You cannot save the maiden unless you are prepared to kill the dragon”—and the dragon in Bosnia and Herzegovina is dysfunctionality. We have done everything but address dysfunctionality of the light-level state, which can deliver to its citizens the thing that you want the citizens to have and that build loyalty to the state. So much is going on so many levels of government and so much is vanishing in corruption, and dysfunctional states give the opportunity to disturb, as they are doing, and to cause turbulence. It gives a space in which Russia and, who knows, perhaps Turkey, can play mischief. But if you build a functional state, as we did by creating a single army, intelligence service, customs system, independent taxation authority and judiciary, those are the beginnings of a functional, light-level state. We have done anything but address that; we have stuffed the dragon’s mouth with gold, in the hope that he will behave nicer, and snuck up behind him, saying that this is not about functional change—it is just about economic reform—and hoped that he would not notice. The result is that Bosnia has continued to go backwards, and that has given opportunities to the secessionists and those who would break the place up to make sure that the country is ungovernable.
So here we are now: this is the situation. I know perfectly well, because they have been perfectly open, about what they intend to do. Both the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska and the leader of the Croat nationalist party are following the policies of the President of Montenegro, Milo Đukanović, whose policy and strategy was to make unworkable the relationship with Serbia until we, the international community, gave up patience and said, “Oh, all right, have your independence”. That is the policy that they are following, and they are winning. We are not taking the initiative. We have spent £20 billion in Bosnia and had 22 years of engagement, yet the initiative is with  them not us. They set the agenda and we respond, because we will not tackle the issue of how to build a functional, light-level state. You cannot save the maiden if you are not prepared to risk killing the dragon, and the dragon is dysfunctionality.
We should bear in mind that the European Union has more instruments of leverage and political pressure in Bosnia than in any other nation on earth, with a huge aid programme, an EUSR and a high representative with Bonn powers, although we could never use them again as we did in the past, obviously. And there is a police mission—yet we have lost the agenda. We have now to regain it in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By the way, one of the best ways in which to do that is to isolate the recidivists. I cannot imagine why anybody gives house room to Mr Milorad Dodik, who is determined on splitting up Bosnia and Herzegovina and destroying our policy. Yet we receive him in Brussels and in European capitals and we allow his lobbying organisations space to be represented. Every time you do that, you confer on him the respect of the international community, which reads only one way—that they are more interested in having him in than they are in being in the European Union.
We have been on the back foot for far too long, and now the European Union, which ought to be our primary instrument, is being used as an instrument in the hands of the recidivists and secessionists—unwittingly, because people have not spotted what is going on. Let me explain. We have acceded to the entry of Croatia into the European Union. Every single Croat citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina is entitled to a Croatian passport. They have no further interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because they now get their freedom and citizenship status in the European Union through their Croat citizenship.
In 1995, I sat next to Franjo Tuđman at the 50th anniversary of VE Day. He had drunk a little bit too much white wine, to be honest with you. I asked him at one stage what was the future, and he drew me a map on the back of a menu—it is called a “mapa na servijetu”—of the Balkans. He drew a picture and drew a line down it and said, “This is Croatia, this is Serbia”. “Where is Bosnia?”. “No Bosnia”. Then he drew a little circle around Sarajevo and said, “The Muslims can live there”. I took that map to the International Criminal Tribunal. I told Douglas Hurd about it and released it at the time of the great Croat offensive, which had the effect of alerting the international community. We are now delivering exactly—inadvertently, sleep-walking, through the European Union—the greater Croatia of Tuđman’s dreams.
The Croat president, the other day, turned round to Croat citizens in Bosnia and said, “Just understand that your first identity is Croat, not Bosnian”. As if that were not bad enough, we are now about to do exactly the same with Serbia. Serbia is now at the front rank of reaching the European Union. When it does, every Serb citizen in Bosnia and Herzegovina will have a double passport: a Bosnian passport and a Serb passport. And every one of them will be able to have the full benefits of European citizenship. They will have no interest in the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because they do not need it. There will be no price to  pay for obstructing the process of Bosnia, because they have another country to look to. Do we not realise what we are doing? In these circumstances, we are recreating the greater Serbia and the greater Croatia, with the Bosniak Muslims isolated in the middle. That is exactly the situation that started 1992. It will not happen again, because the Bosniak Muslims will not allow themselves to be isolated in the midst of their enemies. It is bound to go to conflict.
Sometimes, we confuse ourselves by dealing with ethnicities. There is no difference between the Croat, the Serb and the Bosniak; the only difference is their religion. Let us look at it, then, in religion terms: the inadvertent result of the European Union’s current policy—unless it changes—is that the Roman Catholics in Herzegovina will get to Europe and have a future there, the Orthodox religion of the Serbs will get to Europe and have a future there, but the Muslims in the middle will be isolated. Has nobody any idea what that means in terms of the geopolitical consequences today? This is a very serious problem that will blow Bosnia and Herzegovina apart. We have to find a solution to this. My own one is that, the moment we introduce or allow accession to Serbia, we should say that the right of full European citizenship applies to citizens who live in Serbia, but that citizens who have their double citizenship and live in Bosnia should not be allowed to get those full rights of European citizenship until Bosnia itself has fulfilled the standards to reach the European Union.
This is a profoundly dangerous situation. We are acting as the unwitting deliverers of the policies of Tuđman, Mladić, Karadžić and Milošević—by mistake; we do not mean to, but we are sleep-walking into it. I simply say that if we hold a European summit, as we are about to do, and we do not begin to address this problem, that summit will not be worth the name of a European summit, because it will have failed to begin the process of turning us away from that very profound danger.